In this study, we investigate whether audit managers' assessment of the quality of work their subordinates perform is influenced by the managers' prior impressions of these subordinates, and whether managers whom the firm considers outstanding are less susceptible to such an effect. We conduct an experiment using actual audit senior-manager teams. Each senior and manager participating in the experiment has been classified by his or her firm as either outstanding or average. Each manager is paired with two audit seniors (one outstanding senior and one average senior), and each evaluates the memos written by his or her paired seniors. Managers evaluate the quality of the memos twice: (1) first, with the identities of the seniors indicated on the memos, and (2) later, when the seniors' identities are not explicitly revealed. Results show that average managers evaluate memos written by outstanding seniors more favorably than those written by average seniors when they know the identities of the memos' authors, but not when the identities of the seniors are not revealed. Outstanding managers do not appear susceptible to this effect.
In this paper, we investigate whether audit managers' assessment of the quality of their subordinates' work depends on their prior impressions of these subordinates. We also investigate whether managers whom the firm considers outstanding (based on their overall performance ratings) are less susceptible to any such effect. Audit managers (reviewers) frequently work with a regular group of audit seniors (preparers), so the managers become familiar with the subordinates whose performance they must assess. This familiarity with subordinates can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the review process. For example, Asare and McDaniel (1996) conclude that auditors who review the work of a familiar preparer re-perform less of the preparer's work and detect more conclusion errors, relative to reviewers of an unfamiliar preparer. However, a reviewer's general impression formed from prior interactions may impair the reviewer's ability to objectively assess the preparer's work (e.g., Longenecker et al. 1987) . Our study provides empirical evidence on this issue.
Reviewers' ability to objectively evaluate preparers' work is important for several reasons. First, inability to objectively evaluate the quality of preparers' work limits the extent to which the audit review process is an effective quality-control mechanism. The review process has been associated with process gains such as enhanced attention to inconsistent evidence (Libby and Trotman 1993) , as well as the detection of conclusion and documentation errors (Ramsay 1994) . Such gains may be attenuated if reviewers are more influenced by their prior impressions of the preparers than by the actual quality of the workpapers submitted for review. For example, reviewers who over-rely on the work of a preparer perceived to be competent may become less vigilant in finding inconsistencies and let errors go undetected, thereby impairing audit effectiveness. Reviewers who under-rely on the work of a preparer perceived to be less competent may spend excessive time scrutinizing or reperforming the preparer's work, impairing audit efficiency. Second, the precision and accuracy of the feedback provided by the review process hinge on the evaluations' objectivity. If reviewers systematically accord better evaluations to preparers based on general impressions from prior interactions (as opposed to the actual quality of work done on the specific assignment), then the quality of the feedback on specific assignments is impaired. The learning environment may become more impoverished, and related errors in promotion decisions can also occur. Third, if a reviewer's ex ante impression of a preparer does influence the reviewer's assessment of the preparer's current work, impression management and self-enhancement activities are likely to affect an auditor's career (Emby and Gibbins 1988; Rich et al. 1997; Tan and Libby 1997) .
We conduct an experiment in which we assess audit managers' ability to objectively evaluate the quality of preparers' work. Our experiment matches each audit manager with two audit seniors with whom the audit manager is familiar. The firm's performance evaluation system rates one of the seniors as outstanding, and the other as average. The firm has also classified the audit managers as either outstanding or average. These managers evaluate the quality of justification memos written by their assigned seniors. The managers provide two evaluations: (1) when the identities of the seniors are revealed, and (2) three weeks later, when the identities of the seniors are not explicitly revealed.
We find that average audit managers accord better evaluations to memos written by outstanding seniors than to those written by average seniors-but only when the managers know the seniors' identities. This result is consistent with auditors assessing the quality of their subordinates' work at least partially based on the perceived competence of these subordinates, and not exclusively by the quality of the specific piece of work under review. We also provide evidence that outstanding managers are less susceptible to this effect.
Our inferences are based on an experiment that captures important environmental features of the audit review process that prior studies have not captured. For example, in prior research on the review process, the preparers are hypothetical (see Philips [1999] for a recent example), anonymous (see Trotman 1985) , or possibly unfamiliar to the reviewer (Solomon 1982) . In practice, however, reviewers do know who prepared the workpapers submitted for review, and reviewers at the manager level are usually familiar with the seniors on the audit team. In addition, given that managers play a major role in the subordinates' performance evaluation, managers are also likely to be aware of the overall performance ratings of the subordinates with whom they work.
1 Our experimental design captures these elements by: (1) limiting participants to audit-team members who generally work with each other in a natural setting, and (2) assessing whether audit managers' knowledge of the preparers' identities affects their evaluations of the quality of the preparers' work. Our evidence suggests that benefits of the review process documented in prior studies may depend on whether reviewers are influenced by their awareness of the identities (and relative standings) of the workpaper preparers. We believe that this study provides the first empirical demonstration that the ability to objectively assess subordinates' work is another dimension of auditor expertise.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the previous literature and develops our hypotheses. Section III describes the experiment. Section IV presents the results. Section V summarizes the findings and comments on the study's implications.
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In practice, reviewers typically know who prepared the workpapers submitted for review. However, prior research has seldom captured this feature. For example, in many studies on the process gains stemming from the review process, the workpaper preparers are hypothetical because researchers prepared the experimental materials (e.g., Libby and Trotman 1993; Ramsay 1994) .
Other studies on the audit review process do employ actual (rather than hypothetical) preparers (e.g., Solomon 1982; Trotman 1985; Ismail and Trotman 1995) . In some of these studies, the reviewers do not know the preparers' identities (e.g., Trotman 1985) ; in others, the subjects are selected based on availability rather than on prior interactions, and it is unclear how familiar the reviewers are with the preparers (e.g., Solomon 1982; Ismail and Trotman 1995) .
Two studies investigate the effects of subjects' familiarity with the preparers' competence. Bamber (1983) manipulates reviewers' perceptions of preparer reliability by informing the reviewers of hypothetical preparers' levels of reliability, then asking the reviewers to assess the likelihood that the preparers' conclusions about the internal control system are true. The results show that reviewers do discount information from less reliable preparers. Asare and McDaniel (1996) manipulate subjects' familiarity with the preparer by describing the preparer as someone the reviewer either knows or does not know from prior engagements. They find that reviewers, when informed of their familiarity with hypothetical preparers, have more confidence in and re-perform less of the familiar preparer's work. However, prior research has not addressed whether reviewers incorporate into the review process their general impressions of actual preparers with whom they are familiar.
Applying findings on the ''halo effect'' documented in the psychology literature (Cooper 1981; Bernardin and Beatty 1984; Murphy et al. 1993) to the audit review context, we suggest that reviewers who know the workpaper preparers' identities may assess the quality of the workpaper based on past impressions. Pressures in the work environment make it difficult for a rater to monitor the actual work of all of his or her subordinates (Cooper 1981) . The rater observes small samples of each subordinate's behavior and, over time, forms a general impression of each individual. In subsequent performance appraisals, the rater relies heavily on this prior general impression rather than on the more cognitively demanding task of attending to and monitoring the subordinate's work. This suggests that reviewers may form initial impressions based on inadequate samplings of ratee behavior, and that these general impressions, once formed, may be resistant to change. The halo effect may thus undermine the rater's ability to assess objectively the strengths and weaknesses of a ratee's performance on a specific task (Nathan and Lord 1983) .
Underlying the halo effect are the psychological processes of impression formation and confirmation bias that make the process of performance appraisal liable to self-fulfilling prophecies (Darley and Fazio 1980; Balzer 1986) . A superior's initial impression of a subordinate creates expectations and leads to selective encoding and interpretation of that subordinate's subsequent performance-an interpretation consistent with what the superior had expected (Johnson and Judd 1983) . Initial impressions can also serve as retrieval cues, increasing the likelihood that the superior selectively recalls information (Snyder and Uranowitz 1978) . Furthermore, the superior may interpret as positive a particular behavior from an employee labeled as ''good,'' whereas the superior may interpret that same behavior far more negatively if the employee is labeled as ''poor'' (Balzer 1986; Martell and Willis 1993) .
These findings suggest that when audit managers review seniors' work in a natural setting, knowledge of those seniors' identities (and of their relative performance rankings) is likely to influence the managers' evaluations. Specifically, we predict that when managers know the seniors' identities, the manager will evaluate work performed by seniors deemed to be outstanding (per the firm's performance evaluation system) more favorably than they will the very same quality work performed by those seniors deemed average; we expect this differential evaluation to be smaller when the managers do not know the seniors' identities. Our hypothesis is formally expressed as follows:
H1:
The extent to which an audit manager rates the work of an outstanding senior more highly than that of an average senior will be greater when the seniors' identities are known than when they are not known.
Tacit managerial knowledge has three components: knowing how to manage oneself, knowing how to manage others, and knowing how to manage a career (Wagner and Sternberg 1985; Tan and Libby 1997) . Knowing how to manage others includes knowing how to manage one's subordinates and monitor their work. Thus, auditors with greater tacit managerial knowledge should be better able to assess their subordinates' work objectively, provided they possess the requisite technical knowledge. Prior research has shown that outstanding managers (according to their firms' performance evaluation systems) have better tacit managerial knowledge than do average managers, and that managers (both outstanding and average) possess relatively high levels of general technical knowledge (Tan and Libby 1997) . Given their lower tacit managerial knowledge, average managers may be more likely (than outstanding managers) to rely on seniors' performance evaluation as a cue on the quality of their subordinates' work, rather than objectively assessing the actual quality of the work. This suggests that outstanding managers are more likely than are average managers to assess the work of their subordinates objectively: H2: Knowledge of seniors' identities will have more impact on average managers' than outstanding managers' evaluations of the seniors' work.
III. RESEARCH METHOD Subjects
Our subjects consist of 40 audit seniors (mean experience ϭ 37 months) and 20 audit managers (mean experience ϭ 98 months) from two Big 5 firms. Seventy percent of the subjects come from Firm 1, and 30 percent from Firm 2. Each auditor participating in this study is selected by either a training manager working under the guidance of the staff partner (for Firm 1) or by a senior partner (for Firm 2). Subjects meet two criteria: (1) each manager is paired with seniors with whom he or she normally works, and (2) one of these seniors is considered to be outstanding, and the other is considered to be average, according to the firm's performance evaluation system. The managers are also classified as either outstanding or average.
2 On average, outstanding and average managers have 109 months and 88 months of experience, respectively (F ϭ 1.10, p ϭ 0.308). Outstanding and average seniors have 43 and 31 months of experience, respectively (t ϭ 3.55, p ϭ 0.001).
Procedure
The experiment consists of two major parts. In the first part, the audit seniors write memos to their paired managers. Specifically, the audit seniors are informed of the name of the specific manager with whom they have been paired. Each senior reads a description of a case (see discussion of case material in the next section), and then writes a memo to his or her paired manager on the key issues of which the manager should be aware. The second part of the experiment involves the audit managers, and comprises two stages. In Stage 1, the managers assess memos handwritten by their paired seniors. We provide the handwritten memos as evidence that they are written by the specific paired seniors-assuming that the managers are likely to recognize the handwriting of their paired seniors. Each preparer's identity appears on the corresponding memo, but the memo does not indicate whether its preparer is an outstanding or an average senior. 4 Managers evaluate the two memos on a separate sheet bearing two 11-point scales, one scale for each memo. Each scale ranges from 0 (very poor memo) to 10 (extremely good memo). The managers are assured that their ratings of the memos will be confidential, and not revealed to the seniors. As a control, one of the authors personally administered the instrument to each manager.
Stage 2 is conducted about three weeks later so that the managers' memories of the grades they had assigned to the seniors will be cleared.
5 Each manager again evaluates the quality of memos written by the same two seniors they evaluated in Stage 1. This time, the memos are typewritten, and we removed each senior's identification. We also randomized the order in which managers read the memos. 6 Two features of our experiment should be noted. First, the manager grades each senior's memo twice, once when the identity of the memo's preparer is disclosed, and once when it is not disclosed. This within-subject design holds constant individual differences in rating leniency. Second, the participating firm formed teams in which each manager has about the same experience working with each of the two assigned seniors. This reduces the likelihood that differences in evaluations are due to differences in the managers' familiarity with the outstanding and average seniors.
Case Material
The case upon which the memos are written is adapted from Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) and involves a long-standing audit client that produces soundcards for personal computers. An aging analysis suggests that part of the accounts receivable is overdue, but that the part of accounts receivable in question concerns a new product for which there is no history. The additional provision in question is not material to the client's assets, but can result in the client violating its debt covenants because current profits are low. The client is willing to make a footnote disclosure about the slow cash collection, but does not want to make an accrual for an additional allowance. The audit seniors participating in our study each write a memo to their audit managers regarding whether to insist on an additional allowance for doubtful accounts, or to accede to the client's request.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Tests of Subjects' Familiarity
We assess subjects' familiarity with their matched partners in two ways. First, we ask subjects to rate, on an 11-point scale, the degree to which they know the working styles and preferences of their paired managers or seniors (0 ϭ extremely unfamiliar; 10 ϭ extremely familiar). The ratings by seniors and managers are 6.20 and 6.40, respectively. Second, we ask subjects to indicate the percentage and length of their time spent working with their matched partners. Seniors and managers report spending an average of 40 percent and 19 percent of their time working with each other, respectively; this amounts to about 21 months of interaction. We find no significant differences in familiarity ratings and interaction time between outstanding and average managers (smallest p Ͼ 0.510), or between outstanding and average seniors (smallest p Ͼ 0.494). We also find no difference in the 5 Certain features of the experiment reduce the impact of any discussion between managers and seniors that takes place between Stages 1 and 2. First, seniors write the memos under supervised conditions and return the memos to the researchers immediately after completion, so they do not have copies of their own memos. Second, managers evaluate the memos under equally controlled conditions; the memos are returned to the researchers after evaluation; at Stage 1 the managers are unaware they will be asked to evaluate the memos a second time. This reduces the likelihood that they will attempt to record the content of the memos or their evaluations, or to talk to the seniors to learn about the memos. 6 The handwritten memos with seniors' identification in Stage 1 preserve the natural setting under which managers operate, and avoid potential demand effects. Had we removed the seniors' identification and typed the memos in Stage 1, this may have alerted managers to the issue we are investigating and led to unintended demand effects in Stage 2. In addition, we maintain a three-week interval between the Stage 1 and Stage 2 evaluations, and at Stage 1 we do not inform managers that they will be making a second evaluation.
experience level of seniors assigned to the outstanding and average managers (mean experience ϭ 38 and 36 months, respectively; F ϭ 0.38, p ϭ 0.543).
Main Results
Outstanding vs. Average Senior's Memo Ratings
To assess managers' ratings of the outstanding senior's work relative to the average senior's work, we compute ''Diffrating,'' defined as Rating outstanding senior Ϫ Rating average senior . This pairwise difference reflects the fact that the same manager rates both the outstanding senior and the average senior, thereby controlling for individual differences in evaluations. A positive Diffrating measure means that audit managers rate outstanding seniors higher than average seniors, and conversely.
Descriptive statistics appear in Table 1 . To test our hypotheses, we conduct a mixed ANOVA with Stage (Stage 1, Stage 2) as a repeated measure, and Manager Rank (outstanding, average) as a between-subject factor (see Table 2 ).
Hypothesis 1 predicts that knowledge of the seniors' identities will lead managers to assign systematically higher (lower) ratings to the work performed by outstanding (average) seniors. This suggests that Diffrating will be higher in Stage 1 (when managers know the seniors' identities) than in Stage 2 (when the seniors' identities are not disclosed). Consistent with H1, Table 1 shows that Diffrating is higher in Stage 1 than in Stage 2 (means ϭ 1.02 and Ϫ0.27, respectively), and Table 2 shows that the main effect of Stage is statistically significant at p ϭ 0.012 (F ϭ 6.06).
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Hypothesis 2 predicts that this difference in ratings received by outstanding and average seniors across Stages 1 and 2 will be greater for the average managers than for the outstanding managers. Consistent with this hypothesis, Table 2 shows that the two-way interaction between Stage and Manager Rank is significant at p ϭ 0.021 (F ϭ 4.82). The main effect of Manager Rank is not statistically significant (F ϭ 0.01, p ϭ 0.913).
Given the significant Stage ϫ Manager Rank interaction, we next separately analyze Diffrating (across Stage 1 and Stage 2) for average and then for outstanding managers. For average managers, Diffrating is significantly higher in Stage 1 (mean ϭ 1.55) than in Stage 2 (mean ϭ Ϫ0.90; difference in means ϭ 2.45, F ϭ 10.34, p ϭ 0.006). Thus, when all the memo authors' identifies are known, average managers rate the memos written by outstanding seniors more highly than memos written by average seniors-but not when the seniors' identifies are not disclosed. By contrast, outstanding managers' Diffrating does not differ significantly across Stages 1 and 2 (mean ϭ 0.50 and 0.36 in Stages 1 and 2, respectively; difference in means ϭ 0.14, F ϭ 0.04, p ϭ 0.851). Therefore, outstanding managers objectively evaluate the work performed by both outstanding and average seniors, and are not significantly influenced by the seniors' identities.
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As a further analysis, we conduct a mixed ANOVA with Stage 1 and Stage 2 ratings for outstanding seniors as a within-subject variable, and Manager Rank as a between-subject variable. Results show a significant two-way interaction (F ϭ 10.01, p ϭ 0.005), a marginally significant main effect of Stage (F ϭ 4.20, p ϭ 0.055), and no significant main effect of Manager Rank (F ϭ 0.03, p ϭ 0.868). Average managers accord higher ratings to the 7 All directional tests are one-tailed tests. 8 To assess any effects of firm affiliation, we include subjects' firm affiliation (Firm) as a dummy variable in our hypotheses tests. Firm does not significantly interact with the independent variables (smallest p ϭ 0.324), and our results are unchanged by the inclusion of the Firm variable. We also re-analyze our results using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which yields identical inferences for H1 (p ϭ 0.011) and H2 (p ϭ 0.009 and 0.573 for tests related to average and outstanding managers, respectively). * p Ͻ 0.10. ** p Ͻ 0.05. *** p Ͻ 0.001. a Each manager is paired with two seniors (one outstanding and one average), and rates the memos written by each senior twice: once when the identity of the memo's preparer is disclosed, and again when the identity of the memo's preparer is not disclosed. The rating scale ranges from 0 (very poor memo) to 10 (extremely good memo). Seniors and managers are classified as outstanding or average based on their firm's performance evaluation ratings. a Diffrating is defined as each manager's rating of the memo written by the outstanding senior minus his or her rating of the memo written by the average senior. Managers' ratings are made on a scale that ranges from 0 (very poor memo) to 10 (extremely good memo). Seniors are classified as outstanding or average based on their firm's performance evaluation ratings. b Managers are classified as outstanding or average based on their firm's performance evaluation ratings. c Managers rate the memos written by each senior twice: in Stage 1 when the identity of the memo's preparer is disclosed, and again in Stage 2 when the identity of the memo's preparer is not disclosed.
work by the outstanding seniors when the managers know the seniors' identities than when they do not (F ϭ 16.62, p ϭ 0.003). In contrast, outstanding managers' ratings of outstanding seniors' memos are not significantly different across Stage 1 and Stage 2 (F ϭ 0.53, p ϭ 0.487). We repeat the previous analysis using Stage 1 and Stage 2 ratings for average seniors, and find no significant main or interaction effects (p Ͼ 0.309), indicating that the managers (both outstanding and average) do not rate the average seniors any differently in Stages 1 and 2. This set of results suggests that the average managers are influenced by knowledge of the outstanding seniors' identities, while outstanding managers are not.
To assess whether the memos evaluated by the outstanding managers are systematically different from those evaluated by the average managers, we ask audit partners to assess the memos written by the seniors. These memos are typewritten and do not identify their authors. For Firm 1, four partners assess the seniors' memos, and we use the median ratings among the four partners for each senior in the following analysis. For Firm 2, only the technical partner assesses the seniors' memos. Using the partners' ratings, we compute a measure, Partner Rating outstanding senior Ϫ Partner Rating average senior , for each pair of seniors assigned to each manager, and find no significant difference attributable to Manager Rank (mean ϭ Ϫ0.50 for both outstanding and average managers; t ϭ 0.00, p ϭ 1.000). Among the memos assessed by the average managers, the mean partner ratings for the memos written by outstanding and average seniors are not statistically different (means ϭ 4.75 and 5.25, respectively; paired t-test ϭ 0.85, p ϭ 0.416); neither are they different for the memos assessed by the outstanding managers (means ϭ 4.67 and 5.17, respectively; paired t-test ϭ 0.56, p ϭ 0.593).
9 These partner ratings indicate that there is no difference in the quality of memos evaluated by outstanding and average managers.
10 This enhances our confidence in the inference that average managers-but not the outstanding managers-become less objective when they know the seniors' identities.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This study investigates whether audit managers objectively evaluate memos written by their subordinates. As predicted, we find that when average managers are aware of the seniors' identities, the managers evaluate memos written by outstanding seniors more favorably than they do those written by average seniors. However, this does not occur when the authors' identities are not disclosed. That the same managers make the evaluations in both instances (with and without knowledge of the seniors' identities) suggests that the higher evaluation of outstanding seniors is due to the managers' knowledge of the seniors' identities and not to superior performance of the outstanding seniors on the specific task at hand. By contrast, outstanding managers' ratings do not depend on their knowledge of the seniors' identities. Thus, the ability to evaluate the work of subordinates objectively is an attribute of auditor expertise.
Prior research suggests that it may be important for audit seniors to undertake justification and self-promotion to manage the perceptions of their managers (e.g., Emby and Gibbins 1985; Rich et al. 1997) . The results in this study imply that, to the extent that managers have formed a favorable impression of a subordinate (either through the management of managers' impressions or through actual good performance), the subordinate's subsequent behaviors may be interpreted more favorably. Our results also suggest that reviewers (specifically, average managers) may anchor their evaluations on knowledge of the preparers' prior performance. This strategy has merit from a Bayesian perspective, in that ''better'' (prior overall) performers are more likely to perform well in the future. However, there are disadvantages for the quality both of feedback and of performance evaluation. Providing assessments solely on the basis of prior performance may lead to inaccurate feedback, which limits subordinates' ability to learn from the feedback. The limitation of using past performance as an indicator of future performance is accentuated when subordinates perform tasks that require different skills than those currently employed (see Libby and Tan 1994; Tan and Kao 1999) .
Some environmental features in public accounting firms may mitigate these concerns. First, audit seniors generally work with different managers on different assignments, and they should, over time and across assignments, benefit from receiving feedback and performance evaluations from different managers. Second, in some public accounting firms (see footnote 1), annual performance evaluations are shared among managers, or made in a group setting. This suggests that average managers can benefit from learning about subordinates' performance evaluations that are made by other managers (particularly the outstanding ones). Moreover, the overall group evaluation of a subordinate's performance should incorporate outstanding managers' opinions (which are relatively more objective).
One limitation of our study is the small sample size. This limitation results from two conditions imposed by our research design: (1) auditors must have worked with each other for a significant period, and (2) audit managers and seniors must be ranked high or low based on their firm's performance evaluation. These criteria constrain the number of subjects available. Our paper also does not directly address how knowledge of subordinates' identities moderates process gains arising from the review process. This is an important question for future research. In addition, our study focuses on managers' assessment of seniors' work, not on how partners or seniors assess the work done by auditors at other ranks (i.e., we cannot rule out that the effects here may be specific to the manager-senior ranks).
Another limitation of our study is that the outstanding seniors are also more experienced than the average seniors. Thus, average managers' higher ratings of outstanding seniors' work may be due either to the perceived competence of the outstanding seniors, to the greater experience of these seniors, or to both attributes. Our debriefing with the six managers from Firm 2 provides some evidence on this issue. We find that all of these managers know the relative performance ratings of their paired seniors. Moreover, when asked to explain why one senior is better than is the other, the majority indicate technical competence (five managers) and the ability to see a ''big picture'' (four managers) as key attributes of the more outstanding senior. Only two managers mention experience as an attribute, and none mention experience to the exclusion of other attributes. This provides some evidence that experience is unlikely to be the only or most important cue. Future research can attempt to partition the differential impact of a preparer's experience level and perceived competence level on reviewers' assessments.
Effects of awareness of subordinates' prior performance documented in this experiment are likely to be more pronounced in field settings. In such settings, time pressure, delays between task performance and performance evaluation, and the lack of objective criteria in assessing performance may exacerbate the effects reported here. Future research can examine mechanisms that may improve auditors' objectivity in evaluating their subordinates' work. Instruction and training may attenuate such biases (see Thornton and Zorich 1980) , but this question awaits empirical investigation.
